There are also many non-governmental organizations that promote a global reduction in nuclear weapons and offer research and analysis on U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Among these organizations, the Arms Control Association, which was founded in 1971 to promote public understanding and support for arms control, is notable. Others include: Arms control is a term for international restrictions on the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation and use of small arms and light weapons, conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. [1] Arms control is generally exercised through the use of diplomacy, which aims to impose such restrictions on consenting participants through international treaties and agreements, although it may also include efforts by a nation or group of nations to impose restrictions on a non-consenting country. Scientists and practitioners such as John Steinbruner, Jonathan Dean and Stuart Croft have worked intensively on theoretical support for arms control. Arms control is supposed to break the security dilemma. It aims at mutual security between partners and overall stability (whether in a crisis situation, a grand strategy or stability to end an arms race). In addition to stability, arms control goes hand in hand with cost reduction and damage limitation. It differs from disarmament in that the maintenance of stability could allow for mutually controlled armament and cannot maintain peace without weapons. Nevertheless, arms control is in principle a defensive strategy, because transparency, equality and stability are not part of an offensive strategy. According to a 2020 study published in the American Political Science Review, arms control is rare because successful arms control agreements involve a difficult compromise between transparency and security. For arms control agreements to be effective, there must be a way to thoroughly verify that a State is complying with the agreement, for example through intrusive inspections.

Although such a violation was not repeated during the 2020 flight season, Russia continued to claim that its rejection of the agreed TSENTR overflight segment did not violate the contract. Russia claims that the reason for the rejection was a plethora of caution for the safety of the OST mission, which could not be guaranteed when conducting a live-fire exercise in the planned overflight area. As we saw in last year`s report, this is not a valid justification within the meaning of the Treaty. The nature of the de-escalation of airspace required in this situation is common and Article VI(I)(15) of the Treaty provides: “The observed Party shall ensure that its air navigation services facilitate the conduct of observation flights under this Treaty.” Therefore, in this situation, Russia should have ensured the safe facilitation of the agreed OST mission plan for the second segment, rather than denying it. In addition, the observer parties proposed to revise the agreed segment through exercise TSENTR to fly at a height permitted by the Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) applicable to general air traffic in the region. Russia has also refused to allow this revised segment. The compliance report includes reports and analyses at classification levels for which reliable supporting information is available. The unclassified version of this report contains as much information as possible, but some issues can only be discussed at higher classification levels. For example, some compliance concerns are raised and some findings of violations are made only in the SECRET or TOP SECRET/SCI version of this report and not in the unclassified version. Because of our deep-rooted legal traditions, our commitment to the rule of law, and our belief in the importance of such agreements in strengthening our security and that of our allies and partners, the United States is fulfilling its obligations under all applicable arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements.

It has long been the policy of the United States to comply with international legal obligations. To the extent that the United States has determined that the performance of an obligation is no longer in the interest of U.S. national security, the United States has sought to negotiate an amendment to the agreement in question or to withdraw completely from the agreement – as was the case with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear System Treaty or the INF Treaty in 2019 […].